

Non-local games and verifiable delegation of quantum computation

Alex Bredariol Grilo



joint work with Andrea Coladangelo, Stacey Jeffery and Thomas Vidick

Why verifiably delegate quantum computation?

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Why verifiably delegate quantum computation?

- *Superiorita* 😊
- But they are expensive 😞
- Online service 😊
- Can a client be sure that she is experiencing a quantum speedup? 😊

Ideal world

- Goal: Interactive proof system for BQP where


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- Goal: Interactive proof system for BQP where
 - ▶ the verifier runs poly-time prob. computation




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Ideal world




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 - ▶ the protocol is sound against any malicious prover

Ideal world




- Goal: Interactive proof system for BQP where
 - ▶ the verifier runs poly-time prob. computation
 - ▶ an honest prover runs poly-time quantum computation
 - ▶ the protocol is sound against any malicious prover
 - ▶ additional property: the prover does not learn the input

Relaxed models


Exponential-size provers

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
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Almost-classical clients



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Comput. soundness




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Multiple provers




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
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
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- Servers have to keep entangled 😊

Multiple provers



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- “Plug-and-play” 😊

Previous works

	Provers	Rounds	Total Resources	Blind
RUV 2012	2	$\text{poly}(n)$	$\text{poly}(n)$	yes

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McKague 2013	$\text{poly}(n)$	$\text{poly}(n)$	$\geq 2^{153} g^{22}$	yes
GKW 2015	2	$\text{poly}(n)$	$\geq g^{2048}$	yes
HDF 2015	$\text{poly}(n)$	$\text{poly}(n)$	$\Theta(g^4 \log g)$	yes
FH 2015	5	$\text{poly}(n)$	$> g^3$	no
NV 2017	7	2	$> g^3$	no

The results

Delegate circuit Q on n qubits, with g gates and depth d , 2 provers:

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The results

Delegate circuit Q on n qubits, with g gates and depth d , 2 provers:

- Verifier-on-a-leash protocol: $O(d)$ rounds, $O(g \log g)$ EPR pairs, blind
- Dogwalker protocol: 2 rounds, $O(g \log g)$ EPR pairs

Comparing to previous works

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VoL	2	$O(\text{depth})$	$\Theta(g \log g)$	yes
DW	2	2	$\Theta(g \log g)$	no
Relativistic	2	1	g^3	no

1 Basics on quantum computation

2 General idea

3 Our protocols

4 Open problems

Very quick introduction to quantum computation

- 1 qubit

- ▶ Unit vector in \mathbb{C}^2
- ▶ Basis: $|0\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$ and $|1\rangle = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$
- ▶ $|\psi_1\rangle = \alpha |0\rangle + \beta |1\rangle$, $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{C}$ and $|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$

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- n qubits

- ▶ Unit vector in $(\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes n}$
- ▶ Basis: $|i\rangle, i \in \{0, 1\}^n$
- ▶ $|\psi_2\rangle = \sum_{i \in \{0, 1\}^n} \alpha_i |i\rangle$, $\alpha_i \in \mathbb{C}$ and $\sum |\alpha_i|^2 = 1$

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- $|EPR\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$

- ▶ It cannot be written as a product state
- ▶ Source of quantum “spooky actions”
- ▶ For every orthonormal basis $\{|v\rangle, |v^\perp\rangle\}$, $|EPR\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|vv\rangle + |v^\perp v^\perp\rangle)$

Very quick introduction to quantum computation

- Evolution of quantum states
 - ▶ Unitary operators
 - ▶ Composed by gates picked from a (universal) gate-set



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- Projective measurements on $|\psi\rangle$
 - ▶ Set of projectors $\{P_i\}$, s.t. $\sum_i P_i = I$
 - ▶ Output i with probability $\|P_i|\psi\rangle\|^2$
 - ▶ After the measurement, the states collapses to $\frac{P_i|\psi\rangle}{\|P_i|\psi\rangle\|}$


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- $|EPR\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|00\rangle + |11\rangle)$
 - ▶ If measure the first half, the second half is completely defined (independent of the chosen basis)

From quantum delegation to classical delegation




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
- V and P share EPR pairs

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
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- V sends $z_i \in_R \{0, 1\}$

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
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
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
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


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- If P passes tests, then no “harmful” errors


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


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
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
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
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


- Idea: Delegate V to a prover
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- How to test PV ?

Non-local games



Non-local games



- P_1 and P_2 share a strategy before the game start and then they do not communicate


Non-local games



$x, y \sim D$


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
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Non-local games




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
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
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- $\omega^*(G) > \omega(G)$


Bell inequalities and rigidity theorems - Example CHSH

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$$x \cdot y = a \oplus b$$


Bell inequalities and rigidity theorems - Example CHSH



$$x, y \in_R \{0, 1\}$$
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- Classical value $\omega(\text{CHSH}) = \frac{3}{4}$
- Quantum value $\omega^*(\text{CHSH}) = \cos^2(\frac{\pi}{8})$

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


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- Provers share $|EPR\rangle$ and measure

	0	1
P_1	X	Z
P_2	$\frac{X+Z}{\sqrt{2}}$	$\frac{Z-X}{\sqrt{2}}$

Bell inequalities and rigidity theorems - Example CHSH



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- Rigidity: if acceptance prob. is $\omega^*(\text{CHSH}) - \varepsilon$, then strategy is $O(\sqrt{\varepsilon})$ close to the previous one

Our rigidity results

Our game

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- \mathcal{G} is a set of one-qubit Clifford observables
- Game where a constant fraction of the questions are in a random \mathcal{G}^m
- Based on the Pauli Braiding Test

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Honest strategy

Share m EPR pairs and on question of the form $W \in \mathcal{G}^m$ the prover measures the “correct” observable W .

Our rigidity results

Theorem

The honest strategy succeeds with prob. $1 - e^{-\Omega(m)}$ in the game.

Our rigidity results


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
Theorem

For any $\varepsilon > 0$, any strategy for the provers that succeeds with prob. $1 - \varepsilon$ must be $O(\sqrt{\varepsilon})$ -close to the honest strategy.

From quantum delegation to classical delegation




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
- Protocol

From quantum delegation to classical delegation



- Protocol
 - ▶ With prob. p , play non-local game


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
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
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
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- PV is tested with the game

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
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- If both pass the tests, they perform the computation

Verifier-on-a-leash protocol



DogWalker protocol

- In Verifier-on-a-leash protocol

DogWalker protocol

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 - ▶ Rounds of communication for blindness

DogWalker protocol

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
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 - ▶ Rounds of communication for blindness
- In DogWalker protocol
 - ▶ Reveal x to PV

DogWalker protocol

- In Verifier-on-a-leash protocol
 - ▶ Rounds of communication for blindness
- In DogWalker protocol
 - ▶ Reveal x to PV
 - ▶ Extra tests to check if PV is honest

DogWalker protocol



Open problems

- More efficient 1-round schemes ($\tilde{O}(g)$ resources)

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- Blind $O(1)$ -round protocols
- Delegation protocol with non-entangled provers

Thank you for your attention!